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RECENT ILLINOIS DECISIONS.
ABATEMENT AND REVIVAL - ANoTIER ACTION PENDING - WHETHER
PRESENCE OF PENDING ACTION ON SAME CLAIM IN A FOREIGN JURISDICTrION
SERVES AS GROUND FOR DISMISSING COMPLAINT-Construction of a portion
of the Illinois Civil Practice Act was called for in the recent case of
F & F Laboratories, Inc. v. Chocolate Spraying Company.' The proceed-
ing began as a state court suit in equity for an accounting, to which the
defendants filed a counterclaim. The plaintiff then moved, under Section
48 (d) of the Civil Practice Act,2 to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground
that the cause of action set forth therein had been made the subject of a
prior suit then pending between the parties in a federal district court
sitting in the same locality. The trial court sustained this motion and
dismissed the counterclaim. On appeal, the Appellate Court for the First
District affirmed this order, declaring that the statute was broad enough
to be applied to all cases wherein another action is pending without regard
to whether the same is pending in another court of the same state or not.
It has long been the doctrine of the common law that a litigant should
not be subject to the harassment of being obliged to defend multiple suits
on the same claim at the same time when one suit would serve the purpose,
so a defense by way of abatement has been developed to prevent that pos-
sibility. Before abatement could be had, however, it has been the uniform
rule, until now, that the person objecting should, by plea or answer,
demonstrate that the earlier action was (1) based on the same facts;
(2) ran between the same parties, or their privies; (3) was of the same
general nature, both suits being either legal or equitable in character;
(4) was designed to procure the same relief; and (5) was pending in the
same jurisdiction.3 If, therefore, the earlier pending action had been
instituted in some other state, this type of objection was not available.4
16 Ill. App. (2d) 299, 127 N. E. (2d) 682 (1955). Leave to appeal has been
granted. Attention is also called to the decision of the Illinois Supreme Court in
Ginther v. Duginger, 6 11. (2d) 474, 129 N. E. (2d) 147 (1955), where the court
held that the presence of a pending suit in ejectment involving the same parties and
the same premises would not operate to stay a later action in equity designed to
quiet title as the two actions were essentially different in character.
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172(d), specifies that a motion to dismiss
will lie where "there is another action pending between the same parties for the
same cause." Ibid., § 172(2), provides for a similar motion against a counterclaim.
The Revised Civil Practice Act of 1955, H. B. No. 439, § 48, contains similar pro-
visions but the specified ground appears therein as § 48(1) (c).
3 In general, see Clephane, Handbook of the Law of Equity Pleading and Practice
(West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 1926), p. 179.
4 Allen v. Watt, 69 Ill. 655 (1873) ; McJilton v. Love, 13 Ill. 486 (1851).
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Modern procedural methods permit the use of a motion, offered in
advance of pleading, to raise objections of this nature5 but it would
normally be supposed that the substance of the objection would not have
been changed, despite the fact that other procedural methods may have
been devised, 6 since the purpose is the same, that of bringing about no more
than the abatement of the later suit.7 Nevertheless, the court concerned
with the instant case, on the basis of reasoning that if the legislature
had intended to adopt or to place limitations around the specific ground
it could have done so by suitable language, now takes the position that
when the legislature said "another suit pending" it meant "pending any-
where. "8 As it has been held that the pendency of a case in a state court
is no bar to additional proceedings in a federal court,9 it does seem
gratuitous to engraft a contrary limitation on state court authority when
the initial proceeding has been commenced in a federal court.'0
The court did, however, exercise a degree of ingenuity when it took
the doctrine of forum non cnveniens, often utilized to prevent a plaintiff
from litigating out of context," as the basis for a determination that much
the same principle could be applied to a defendant offering a counter-
claim. Since the defendant in the instant case was not obliged to present
the counterclaim, 12 it could have been omitted from the suit without caus-
5 See Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (West Publishing Co., St.
Paul, 1947), 2d Ed., pp. 545-67.
6 Ill. Civ. Prac. Act Anno., p. 118, notes that the objection in question would, at
common law, have been raised "by a plea in abatement." There is no indication
given therein that the framers had in mind any change in the substantive require-
ment but merely contemplated a new, and different, way of presenting the objection.
7 Hinton, Illinois Civil Practice Act (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934),
p. 80, notes that the grounds specified in Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 172,
clauses (a) to (d) inclusive, are "all defenses in abatement. They would not result
in any event in a judgment on the merits, but simply a dismissal."
8 In Culbertson v. Midwest Uranium Co., 132 F. Supp. 678 (1955), a motion to
dismiss, based upon the fact that another suit was pending between the parties in
a federal court in another district, was rejected on the ground the two suits were
lacking in identity since one sought damages for a conversion and the other sought
specific performance in equity. The federal court did, however, treat the motion as
one to stay the proceedings in the second suit, and granted relief accordingly.
9 Premier Malt Products Co. v. Ackerman. 24 F. (2d) 89 (1927).
10 The New York court concerned with the case of Zenie v. Miskend, 245 App. Div.
634, 284 N. Y. S. 63 (1936), affirmed in 270 N. Y. 636, 1 N. E. (2d) 367 (1935), did
not hesitate to reject a motion to abate a state court proceeding because of the
presence of an earlier pending suit in a federal court. The decision therein was
attained after the adoption of the Illinois Civil Practice Act of 1933, so the case
cannot be considered as a controlling precedent under the rule announced in Hansen
v. Raleigh, 391 Ill. 536 at 547, 63 N. E. (2d) 851 at 857 (1945). It should be
remembered, however, that the language of the Illinois statute was taken from'
Thompson Cons. Laws N. Y. 1939, Civil Practice Act, § 278, and N. Y. Rules 106-10.
11 See, for example, Whitney v. 'Madden, 400 Ill. 185, 79 N. E. (2d) 593 (1948).
12 Compare the permissive counterclaim authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2,
Ch. 110, § 162, with the mandatory one required by Fed. Rules Civ. Pro., Rule 13(a).
Under the latter, the defendant Is excused from presenting a counterclaim which is
already the "subject of another pending action."
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ing prejudice. Nevertheless, in the light of the section of the Civil Practice
Act dealing with judgments," a practical injustice could be done if a
court should be permitted to adjudicate upon the plaintiff's case because
it believes the forum to be a convenient one while, at the same time, re-
jecting the protection afforded by a counterclaim simply because the court
conceives that some inconvenience may be present therein. In the absence,
therefore, of a clear-cut and substantial reason for dismissing the counter-
claim, the result reached in the instant case would appear to be lacking
in support.
ADOPTIoN-INHERITANCE By ADOPTE CHILDREN-WHETHER CHILD,
ON SECOND ADOPTION WHmIL FIRST ADOPTING PARENTS ARE STILL LiviNo,
RETAINS IRIGHT TO INHERIT BY DESCENT PROM FIrST ADOPTING PARENTS--
The situation involved in the recent case of In re Leichtenberg's Estate-
posed a new problem for Illinois courts in the field of family law. The
appellee therein, a nephew of the deceased person whose estate was in
probate, had, with the consent of his natural parents, been adopted by his
paternal aunt and her husband many years prior to the action in question.
2
A short time thereafter, the appellee was, again with consent, readopted
by his natural parents at a time when the adopting parents were still
living. After the death of the aunt, her husband having predeceased her,
the appellee sought to be declared her sole surviving heir and, as such,
to be entitled to a preference in inheritance over her blood relatives. The
probate court held otherwise; the circuit court reversed; and, on further
appeal, the Appellate Court for the First District reinstated the finding
of the probate court when it held that the nephew, following readoption,
lost all potential rights to inherit from the first adopting parents.
Prior to the instant decision, no Illinois reviewing court appears to
have had occasion to consider this particular problem although, in the
case of In re Estate of Tilliski,3 it had been held that a child, on adoption,
would not cease being a potential heir of the natural parents. Despite
the novelty of the issue from the Illinois standpoint, the problem is not
13 1l. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 174(3), which directs that, in case a
counterclaim is filed, the judgment "shall be so drawn as to protect the interests
of both parties." This provision was deleted in the Revised Civil Practice Act of
1955, but the essence thereof has been retained: Laws 1955, H. B. 439, § 50(2).
1 Sub nom. Remich v. Mueller, 5 Ill. App. (2d) 336, 125 N. E. (2d) 277 (1955).
Leave to appeal has been granted.
2 There was evidence tending to prove that one of the reasons for the adoption
was that the male adopting parent, who was eligible for draft during World War I,
believed that he could avoid being inducted into military service by claiming that
the appellee was a dependent child. The readoption occurred not long after hostili-
ties were over.
3390 Ill. 273, 61 N. E. (2d) 24 (1945), affirming 323 Ill. App. 490, 56 N. E. (2d)
481 (1944).
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a novel one in a number of other jurisdictions and diametrically opposite
results have been obtained. 4 The Appellate Court, recognizing that the
readoption would not jeopardize rights already vested,5 chose to follow
the view which would deny a continuance of the potential rights of the
adopted child on the ground that, in Illinois, any expectancy could be
rendered worthless in the event the first adopting parents were to take
action to nullify the same.
The court did not, however, take into consideration the holding of
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in the case of Carter Oil
Company v. Norman6 wherein the federal court, construing the Illinois
statute on the point," declared that, upon adoption, a legal relationship
between the adopting parents and the adopted child was created equivalent
to the one which would exist if the child had been born into the family
of the adopting parents. It being settled, in Illinois, that the child does
not lose the right to inherit from the natural parents when adopted but
gains additional rights in the adopting parents, it would seem somewhat
unusual to resolve that these additional rights should be lost when the
child, without its consent,s is readopted. About all that could be said
in favor of that view is that the Appellate Court appears to have felt
itself constrained to give weight to the particular foreign readoption decree
which had declared that the child should be fully restored to the natural
parents "as though no prior adoption had ever been made. '" In the
absence of such a provision, the better solution would seem to be one
contrary to the holding reached in the instant case.
ATTORNEY AND CLIENT -COMPENSATION AND LIEN OF ATTPORNEY -
WHETHER ATTORNEY IS ENTITLED TO ASSERT LIEN AS BASIS FOR REFUSAL
TO PRODUCE REcORDS AND PAPERS SUBPOENAED IN CASE AGAINST CLIENT
FOR FEEs-The Appellate Court for the First District was recently asked,
4 In favor of loss of rights of inheritance are the cases of In re Zaepfel's Estate,
102 Cal. App. (2d) 774, 228 P. (2d) 600 (1951); In re Carpenter's Estate, 327
Mich. 195, 41 N. W. (2d) 349 (1950); In re Klapp's Estate, 197 Mich. 615, 164 N. W.
381 (1917) ; In re Hack's Estate, 166 Minn. 35, 207 N. W. 17 (1926) ; and In re
Talley's Estate, 188 Okla. 338, 109 P. (2d) 495 (1941). Contra: Hawkins v.
Hawkins, 218 Ark. 423, 236 S. W. (2d) 733 (1951) ; Holmes v. Curl, 189 Iowa 246,
178 N. W. 406 (1920) ; Viller v. Watson's Adm'x, 168 Ky. 631, 182 S. W. 869 (1916) ;
and In re Estate of Egley, 16 Wash. (2d) 681, 134 P. (2d) 943, 145 A. L. R. 821
(1943).
5 See Patterson v. Browning, 146 Ind. 160, 44 N. E. 993 (1896).
6131 F. (2d) 451 (1942).
7 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 3, § 165.
8 Ibid., Ch. 4, § 3-3, requires the consent of the child only in the event the child
to be adopted is "of the age of fourteen years or upwards."
9 On the point of the effect to be given to a foreign decree of adoption, see
McLoughlin v. People, 403 Ill. 493, 87 N. E. (2d) 637 (1949).
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in the case of Ross v. Wells,' to decide whether an attorney was entitled
to refuse to produce his records and the like, when called for by a sub-
poena duces tecum, simply because the production thereof might annul
the benefit of his retaining lien. The facts in that case indicate that the
attorney had been employed to render services and had performed for a
period until his discharge. When the attorney instituted suit to recover
his fees, the defendants, desiring to take a discovery deposition,2 caused
a subpoena to be issued calling for the appearance of the plaintiff and
the production of certain books, records and papers pertaining to the
legal services so rendered. The plaintiff appeared and testified but re-
fused to furnish the subpoenaed matter, claiming that to do so would
destroy his right of lien. After a court order on the point had been secured,
the attorney still refused to obey, so proceedings to show cause were in-
stituted. On hearing, these proceedings were dismissed by the trial court
but, on appeal, the judgment of the lower court was reversed when the
reviewing tribunal held that the plaintiff was not entitled to refuse to
produce his records for examination when called for by subpoena.
The right of an attorney to a lien on the papers, books, records, and
other documents of his client has been recognized at common law8 as
well as in cases arising under the Illinois statutory provisions on the
subject.4 It is clear, therefore, that the client may not deprive the attorney
of his lien by discharging the attorney, except for good cause ;5 but the
precise question here presented has never before been passed upon by a
reviewing court in the state. For that matter, the authorities cited by
the plaintiff in support of his position do not touch on the exact point. 6
In the presence of this total dearth of precedent, the court found it nec-
essary to turn to general principles governing the attorney-client relation-
ship to support its holding. Noting that the material subpoenaed reflected
upon the nature of the services rendered and the time and effort expended,
hence became a matter of importance to the action, the court seized upon
the principle that the burden of proof as to such services rested on the
attorney.7 As the client is not required to show fraud or imposition by
16 111. App. (2d) 304, 127 N. E. (2d) 519 (1955).
2 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 82, and § 259.19.
3 Scott v. Morris, 131 I1. App. 605 (1907).
4 See Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 1, Ch. 13, § 14, and Needham v. Voliva, 191 Ill. App.
256 (1915).
5 Cohen v. Kirchheimer, 285 I1. App. 583, 2 N. E. (2d) 592 (1930).
6 Wigmore, Evidence, 3d Ed., Vol. 8, § 2211, at p. 155, states that the court may
decline to compel disclosure of matter under lien when the litigant seeking dis-
closure is the person against whom the lien runs. See also The Flush, 277 F. 25
(1921), and Davis v. Davis, 90 F. 791 (1898), in which cases it was the litigant-
plaintiff, against whom the lien ran, who was seeking disclosure.
7 Warner v. Flack, 278 Ill. 303, 116 N. E. 197, 2 A. L. R. 423 (1917). See also
Goranson v. Solomonson, 304 Ill. App. 80, 25 N. E. (2d) 930 (1940), in which case
the court said the attorney would be obliged to show that the client had been fully
advised as to his rights.
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the attorney, but the latter must assume the responsibility of showing
fairness,8 the court concluded that a compulsory revelation of the records
was consistent with the attorney's duty to make a full disclosure as to
all transactions with his client. This, the court said, would serve to main-
tain a high level of professional ethics, drawing upon impressive language
used in the case of Comerford v. Loewenbein.9 It could be added that the
instant holding does not limit the scope or value of an attorney's retaining
lien but rather points up the fact that such a lien is treated as being no
longer of value once the attorney brings suit to recover for his services,
hence he must, and should be compelled to, use the data in his possession
to substantiate his claim.
DIVORCF-JuRISDICTION, PROCEEDINGS, AND RELIEF-WHiaHER PARTY
To DIVORCE ACTION MAY SEEK VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL AFTER TRIAL BEGUN
WITHOUT COMPLYING WITH TERMS OF CIvL PRACTICE ACT-An issue with
respect to a matter of consequence regarding civil procedure was recently
generated in the case of Gonzalez v. Gonzalez.1 The wife's complaint for
divorce, to which the defendant-husband had filed a counterclaim, had been
set for trial before a jury.2 During the course of the trial and prior to
the submission of the case, the defendant offered a written special motion
to dismiss his counterclaim on the ground that the securing of a divorce
was repugnant to his religious beliefs. This motion was denied by the
trial judge. Following return of a jury verdict in his favor on both the
complaint and the counterclaim, the husband renewed his motion to dis-
miss but this time the trial judge dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice
while also dismissing the wife's complaint for want of equity. On appeal
by the husband, the Appellate Court for the First District held that,
under the circumstances,' it was prejudicial error to enter a decision on
the counterclaim amounting to a determination on the merits and that,
because of the public policy involved in divorce actions, voluntary dis-
missals were to be encouraged notwithstanding the fact the party may
have failed to comply with 'Section 52 of the Civil Practice Act.3
s Ankrom v. Doss, 270 Ill. App. 464 (1933).
9227 Il. App. 321 (1923). At page 327, the court said: "... the law watches
with particular care all transactions had between an attorney and his client during
the period of existence of their relationship ... Presumably, the attorney is learned
in the law and appreciates all that may result from a given transaction with his
client, while, on the other hand, a client is ignorant of the law and does not
appreciate the full consequence of the transaction."
1 6 Ill. App. (2d) 310, 127 N. E. (2d) 673 (1955).
2 Iii. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 8, authorizes trial by jury in divorce cases.
3 Ibid., Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176. Except for the addition of a provision regarding
counterclaimants and third-party plaintiffs, the text of the Revised Civil Practice
Act of 1955, H. B. No. 439, § 52, remains substantially the same as before.
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It is clear that, under the present procedural system, a litigant who
desires to dismiss his suit4 or a defendant who wishes to take a voluntary
nonsuit on his counterclaim,5 whether in an ordinary civil action or in
some form of statutory proceeding,8 must generally comply with statutory
requirements concerning the presentation of a stipulation to dismiss or else
offer a verified special motion, otherwise the case, once trial has been
begun, must proceed to final judgment. It would also be thought, on the
basis of earlier holdings in divorce cases7 as well as by reason of a provision
in the Divorce Act assimilating the procedure in such suits to that utilized
generally, s that much the same considerations would apply to a suit for
divorce. 9 Nevertheless, beginning with the holding in the case of Norwood
v. Norwood,10 there has been an indication that, at least as to matters
of divorce, a too rigid insistence upon statutory requirements could mili-
tate against the settled policy of the state to expend all efforts toward
the maintenance of the marital relation.1 The instant holding, while doing
some violence to procedural methods by creating a special exception for
use in divorce cases, does support that policy so the view taken therein
is probably the one to be lauded rather than criticized.
4 For cases concerning the right of the plaintiff to secure a voluntary dismissal
after trial or hearing has been begun, see Gilbert v. Langbein, 343 Ill. App. 132,
98 N. E. (2d) 140 (1951); Glick v. Glick, 338 Ill. App. 637, 88 N. E. (2d) 509
(1949); Bernick v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 325 Ill. App. 495, 60 N. E. (2d) 442
(1945); Gunderson v. First National Bank, 296 Ill. App. 111, 16 N. U. (2d) 306
(1938).
5 See Wilhite v. Agbayani, 2 Ill. App. (2d) 29, 118 N. E. (2d) 440 (1954), noted
in 32 CHICAGo-KENT LAw REviEw 339.
6 In Perry v. Waddelow, 351 Ill. App. 356, 115 N. E. (2d) 348 (1953), a forcible
entry and detainer action, the court held that Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110,
§ 176, was controlling despite a specific provision in ibid., VoL 1, Ch. 57, § 17, which
also dealt with dismissal of the suit.
7 See, for example, Gifford v. Gifford, 154 Il. App. 416 (1910), denying the plain-
tiff the right to dismiss her bill without prejudice, after verdict in favor of the
defendant, because of non-compliance with Hurd's Ill. Rev. Stat. 1908, Ch. 110, § 70,
which required that the motion to dismiss be offered before the jury retired from
the bar. Accord: Frankenberg v. Frankenberg, 190 Ill. App. 444 (1914). See also
Vaughn v. Vaughn, 197 Ill. App. 611 (1916), as to the right of the plaintiff to dis-
miss the bill of complaint after a cross-bill had been filed.
8 111. Rev. Stat. 1963, Vol. 1, Ch. 40, § 7.
9 The headnotes to the memorandum opinion in Gaiter v. Galter, 323 Ill. App. 297
(1944), as set out in 55 N. E. (2d) 405, particularly headnote 4, disclose that com-
pliance with Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 176, would be required before a
defendant could be entitled to withdraw a counterclaim for divorce from determi-
nation.
10 333 Ill. App. 469, 77 N. E. (2d) 552 (1948).
11 Actually, the court there found the petition to dismiss the complaint did meet
with statutory requirements: 333 II1. App. 469 at 472-3, 77 N. E. (2d) 552 at 553.
The further language in the opinion of the case as to this point must, therefore, be
considered to be dictum.
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HUSBAND AND WIFE - SEPARATION AND SEPARATE MAINTENANCE -
WHETHER WAWVER BY WIPE Op RIGHT TO SuPPORT RENDERS ENTIRE SEPA-
RATION AGREEMENT INVALID--Rights arising under a separation agreement
were considered in the recent case of Laleman v. Crombez.1 In that case,
a husband and wife had entered into a separation agreement adjusting
their property rights and providing for mutual releases of claims in the
property of the other whether then held or subsequently acquired. By a
separate clause of this instrument, the wife agreed that the husband was
not to pay her any money for support and she covenanted to incur no
debts in his name. The parties complied with the agreement for a number
of years but, on the wife's death, the husband began a partition proceeding
against the wife's executrix and devisees asserting an undivided one-half
interest, as heir, in land which had apparently been acquired by the wife
subsequent to the separation. An answer setting forth the separation
agreement as a defense was stricken on motion by the husband and a
partition decree was entered in his favor. On direct appeal by the execu-
trix,2 the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decree when it concluded
that the presence of an invalid clause in the separation agreement did not
force a conclusion that the whole instrument was void. It also held that,
as the husband had enjoyed the benefit of the waiver of support, he could
not be permitted to avoid compliance with the other covenants as they
were not affected by any considerations of public policy.
The conclusion so achieved represents a direct departure from views
expressed by the same court in the earlier case of Lyons v. Schanbachers
and reiterated by it about seven years ago in the case of Lagow v. Snapp.4
In those cases, also involving separation agreements, it was held that the
release of support provisions were not only invalid but were considered
to be so material to the consideration as to render the entire contracts
invalid for, as the court once said, that "which is bad destroys that which
is good, and both perish together.' '5 Until the holding in the instant case,
therefore, it was possible to say that a waiver by a wife of her right to
support, being against public policy, served to invalidate the entire agree-
ment, particularly so since a release of this nature would operate as a ma-
terial consideration for the making of the instrument.
16 Ill. (2d) 194, 127 N. E. (2d) 489 (1955).
2 Direct appeal was proper as a freehold was involved: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, VoL 2,
Ch. 110, 1 75.
3316 Ill. 569, 147 N. E. 440 (1925).
4400 i1. 414, 81 N. E. (2d) 144 (1948).
5 See the opinion of Farmer, J., in Lyons v. Schanbacher, 316 fll. 569 at 574,
147 N. E. 440 at 442. See also Berge v. Berge, 366 Ill. 228, 8 N. E. (2d) 623 (1937).
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By deciding the way it did, the court appears to have acted in a more
equitable manner than it had done in its prior decisions wherein strict
and arbitrary doctrines were relied on. Certainly, the outcome of the
instant case was no doubt affected by the fact that the plaintiff husband
had enjoyed the benefit of the waiver of the right to support for a number
of years, a fact which would make it obviously unfair to now allow the
plaintiff to reap a further benefit by rejecting the burdens of the agree-
ment.
Nevertheless, the court would have been more forthright if it had
declared, as a Pennsylvania court recently did,6 that there is nothing ob-
jectionable in law to a separation agreement which provides for a complete
abnegation of all right to support between the spouses at the time they
make a full division of their property rights, both present and future.
Those who possess a sense of fear over the possibility that either of the
spouses might, at some future time, become a burden on the public treasury
ought to take comfort in decisions such as the one attained by the New
York court concerned with the case of Kyff v. Kyff.7 It was there held
to be the rule that, after exhaustion of the property forming the basis of
the settlement, the indigent spouse might still appeal to the courts to
enforce the support obligation, despite the private arrangement to the
contrary. The rationale there relied upon is comparable to that which has
been followed in Illinois in connection with adopted children.8 If that is
not what the parties want, then their only relief is, and should be, through
channels leading to an absolute divorce where the court, at the time it
dissolves the marital status, may determine the public as well as the private
interest in the retention or dissolution of the support obligation.
NEW TRIAL--PROCEEDINGS TO PROCURE NEW TRIAL--WHETHER JUDI-
CIAL ADDITUR TO AN INADEQUATE VERDICT MAY PROPERLY DEPRIVE LITIGANT
OF RIGHTr TO SE NEW TRIAL-By means of the case of Yep Hong v.
Wiliams,z the Appellate Court for the First District was presented with
the necessity of deciding the question as to whether or not a trial court
may constitutionally condition the right to a new trial upon the defendant's
refusal to consent to an increase by the court in the amount of the verdict
6 Commonwealth ex rel. Jablonski v. Jablonski, - Pa. Super. -, 118 A. (2d) 222
(1955).
7 286 N. Y. 71, 35 N. E. (2d) 655 (1941).
8 Thus, in Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 11. 630, 10 N. E. (2d) 344 (1937), It was held
that the obligation of the natural parent to support his child was not destroyed by
the fact of a judicial adoption of his child by another in the event the adopting
parent proved to be incapable of discharging the burden.
16 I1. App. (2d) 456, 128 N. E. (2d) 655 (1955).
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rendered. In that case, a suit for personal injury, the jury had returned
a verdict against the defendant but for an amount less than the plaintiff's
out-of-pocket expenses. The trial judge indicated that plaintiff's motion
for a new trial would be granted unless the defendant would consent to
an increase in the amount of the verdict. When the defendant refused
to so consent, a new trial was granted. The defendant appealed from that
order 2 but the holding was affirmed when the Appellate Court concluded
that, in tort actions to recover unliquidated damages, the trial court could
not constitutionally condition an order for a new trial on the plaintiff's
acceptance of, or the defendant's refusal to submit to, a judgment in an
amount greater than that fixed by the verdict.
In order to achieve that result, the court relied on a majority opinion
in an earlier case decided by the United States Supreme Court which had
condemned the practice of adding to a verdict in the federal courts as
tending to deprive the litigant of a constitutional right to trial by jury,3
and upon views expressed in some Illinois cases not clearly in point.4 It
would be expected, however, that when a court is, in fact, squarely faced
with a problem for the first time, it would, in the light of the often ex-
pressed public policy favoring the expedition of litigation, study the
issues closely.5
Very briefly, the argument against the use of an additur is said to
lie in the fact that it permits a judge to decide a question of fact in a
way not sanctioned at common law,6 but both the additur and the remitti-
tur, a conditioning of a new trial on the plaintiff's refusal to submit to
a decrease in a verdict, were in use at common law prior to the adoption
of the federal constitution although the justices of the United States
Supreme Court could not agree as to the legitimacy of these devices. It
is clear, however, that by 1870, when the present Illinois constitution was
adopted, the use of the remittitur had come to be a common and respectable
practice in many jurisdictions as well as in Illinois. 7 If this fact could
2 For this purpose, an order granting a new trial is declared to be a "final" order
by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1953, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 201. The recently revised Civil Practice Act
contains a substantially similar provision: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1955, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 77.
3 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 603 (1934). Stone, J.,
wrote a dissenting opinion, concurred in by Hughes, Ch. J., and Brandeis and
Cardozo, JJ.
4 The court cited Carr v. Miner, 42 Ill. 179 (1866), and James v. Morey, 44 Ill.
352 (1867). In these cases an additur was allowed but the suits were based on
contract claims and the damages were liquidated in character. In the first of these
cases, however, the court did say that the practice should be closely restricted.
G See note in 44 Yale L. J. 318.
6 Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 603 (1934). See also
Carlin, "Remittiturs and Additurs," 49 W. Va. L. Q. 1 (1942), particularly pp. 15-24.
7 Blunt v. Little, 3 Mason 102 (U. S., 1822) Miles v. Weston, 60 III. 316 (1871) ;
McCausland v. Wonderly, 56 Ill. 410 (1870); MeAlister v. Mullanphy, 3 Mo. 38
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be said to determine the constitutionality of the remittitur, the constitu-
tionality of the additur should follow because the two, in essence, are in-
distinguishable.8 To allow the one without the other would not only be
incongruous but would leave a plaintiff with a choice not available to a
defendant. It having been held that a plaintiff in a tort case is not en-
titled to a new trial as a matter of right when the jury have returned an
inadequate verdict,9 it would seem that there should be no constitutional
objection to resort to the additur.
But even if the grant of a new trial is not entirely a matter of grace,
an Illinois court might find the additur device a permissible incident to
the wide discretion always accorded trial judges in the matter of new
trials,10 for which purpose it might also consider the desirability of basing
the amount of either the additur or the remittitur on the trial judge's
determination as to the minimum or maximum verdict that a reasonable
jury could obtain.11 As the unconstitutionality of the additur is by no
means obvious, the next Illinois court which grapples with the problem
should do so at much closer quarters than did the court in the instant case.
(1831) ; Tenant's Ex'r v. Gray, 5 Munf. 494 (Va., 1841). In that connection it might
be noted that Ill. Const. 1870, Art. II, § 5, says that the right of trial by jury "as
heretofore enjoyed" shall remain inviolate.
8 Carlin, "Remittiturs and Additurs," 49 W. Va. L. Q. 1 (1942), at p. 3.
9 Bolles v. Bloomington & Normal Ry. E. & H. Co., 130 I1. App. 263 (1906);
Hackett v. Pratt, 52 Il. App. 346 (1893).
10 The dissenting judges in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U. S. 474, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L.
Ed. 603 (1934), thought it was. Stone, J., said: "What the trial court has done is
to deny a motion for a new trial, for what seemed to it a good reason: that the
defendant had given his binding consent to an increased recovery, which the court
thought to be adequate, and thus to remove any substantial ground for awarding a
new trial." See 293 U. S. 474 at 488, 55 S. Ct. 296, 79 L. Ed. 603 at 612.
11 This is the practice followed in Wisconsin. See Risch v. Lawhead, 211 Wis. 270,
248 N. W. 127 (1933) ; Beach v. Bird & Wells Lumber Co., 135 Wis. 550, 116 N. W.
245 (1908).
